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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 2007, the Republic of Romania finally entered the European
Union (EU), along with the Republic of Bulgaria, pursuant to the latest of a
long series of accessions to the EU.' This accession increased the total number
of sovereign nations within the EU to twenty-seven.2 The treaty between the
Union members and the proposed new members was signed on April 25,
2005.' Romania also signed a Protocol, which laid out necessary compliances
that the nation must meet in order for the accession to occur.' Specifically, the
Protocols charged Romania with increasing the security of its borders,
reforming its judiciary, and complying with the Schengen Action Plan
regulating border controls.'
Romania has become a key state in controlling drug trafficking within the
EU since, upon accession, it became the southwestern border of the Union and
lies directly in the path of the major routes that bring drugs into the Continent.'
Among the many concessions that Romania will likely continue to make is a
forced reform of its criminal code, which is relatively weak regarding drug
possession and trafficking, as well as its border control measures in order to
meet the requirements of the Schengen acquis.7
Romania has met many of the requirements mandated by the acquis thus
far, and is determined to fulfill its responsibilities as a new member of the EU.
However, if Romania is forced to make more stringent changes to its criminal
code and national drug policy than its neighbors, this resolve may turn into
Treaty Between Member States of the European Union and the Republic of Bulgaria and
Romania, Concerning the Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European
Union, April 25, 2005, 2005 O.J. (L 157) 11 [hereinafter Accession Treaty].
2 Id.
3Id.
4 Protocol Concerning the Conditions and Arrangements for Admission of the Republic of
Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union, 2005 O.J. (L 157) 29.
' Annex IX: Specific Commitments Undertaken, and Requirements Accepted, by Romania
at the Conclusion of the Accession Negotiations on 14 December 2004, 2005 O.J. (L 157) 201,
202.
6 See European Public Health Alliance, Enlargement Countries Co-ordinate Fight Against
Drug Trafficking, Feb. 19, 2004, http://www.epha.org/a/1081 (discussing Romania's
participation in the Baku conference).
' See infra note 48. Acquis communautaire (French for "asset") or acquis, is the "entire
body of legislation of the European Communities and Union .... Applicant countries must
accept the acquis before they can join the EU." European Commission, Justice and Home
Affairs, Glossary, http://ec.europa.eu/justicehome/glossary/glossaryaen.htm (last visited Oct.
13, 2007).
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resentment and potentially spark a backlash from future acceding nations
against the imposition of such requirements.
Part II of this Note discusses the parallel development of criminalization of
drug possession and trafficking both within Romania as a sovereign nation and
the EU as a whole. This Note examines Romanian laws from the Marxist era,
through the democratic renewal of the 1990s, and into the present day. Next,
the Note traces the historical development of the EU from its beginnings as an
international coal commission to its present ambitions as a federal
commonwealth of independent nations. Also analyzed are the procedures,
both past and present, for accession of member nation-states into the greater
Union with a historical review of past concessions made by members in order
to enter the Union. Finally, the overview concludes by outlining the
development of the EU's legal system as well as the creation of a Continent-
wide comprehensive drug policy. Particular attention is paid to the relation
between drug trafficking and border controls, important in light of the EU's
Maastricht Treaty of February 1992, which provides for "the creation of an
area without internal frontiers." 8
Part III maps out the Romanian accession process from the Accession
Partnership through post-accession requirements. Finally, Part IV analyzes the
impact of accession upon the criminal code, border controls, and interdiction
of drug trafficking. Of interest is the comparison of criminal deterrents and
border control measures for Romania and existing EU Member States. The
subsequent necessity of a change in the Romanian drug policy toward a stricter
model is also analyzed, weighing the responsibilities of other Member States
with those at the border of the EU.
In the future, the EU will also be forced to change its relations with
Member States. It must either require compliance by all Member States with
criminal sanctions against drug trafficking or eliminate the relevant language
within the treaties and the acquis that compels applicant states to change their
internal criminal statutes to match the EU's overarching theme. As the
Member States of the EU are still sovereign nations, and the Union, as a
federal system, is not yet as strong as the United States, this imposition upon
the internal laws of Member States is too invasive. Furthermore, the economic
disparities between Eastern and Western Europe and the undue economic
burden of reform upon Central Europe may result in the halt of enlargement
or even prompt a war. However, if the EU is determined to adopt a federalist
system to govern Europe, the higher imposition of drug policy changes upon
8 Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, art. B, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 4.
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nations constituting the external border of the EU, without a corresponding
imposition on internal states, will likely result in dissolution of the unity the
Union seeks to engender.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Romania
Romania has had a troubled history, marked by invasions, revolutions, and
frequent governmental changes.9 The rule of law has been questionable within
the nation having a history of tyrants ranging from the fifteenth century Vlad
Tepes (the basis for Brain Stoker's Dracula)'° to the twentieth century Nicolae
Ceausescu." Romania dates back to Roman times, when the province ofDacia
was founded in the first century A.D. 2 The modern state of Romania came
into existence in 1859, when the kingdoms of Wallachia and Moldavia
united. 3 The resulting nation adopted its major civil and criminal codes in the
late 1860s, modeling them after the French codification of laws. 4 The Penal
Code of 1936, adopted after the formation of the Romanian national state, was
based upon a classical and positivist model of parliamentary democracy. 5
However, after the end of World War II, leftist organizations began to
vigorously influence the political life of the nation; the creation of a
communist state and subsequent amendments of the Code reflected the new
change of political philosophy.'6 The criminal law was thus turned "into a tool
used by the communist regime primarily to repress anticommunist 'enemies.'
Its secondary role was to combat criminality."' 7 The constitution and codes of
Romania remained in place until December 1989, when the wave of anti-
9 See Romanian Travel Guide, Romanian History, http://www.rotravel.com/romania/history/
index.php (last visited Oct. 13, 2007).
10 Romania, Dracula Legend, http://www.romaniatourism.com/dracula.html (last visited Oct.
13, 2007).
1 Romania, in CIA, WORLDFACTBOOK2007, available at http://www.cia.gov/library/publi
cations/the-world-factbook/geos/ro.html [hereinafter CIA].
12 VIRGILIU STOICOIU, LEGAL SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ROMANIA 1 (1964).
13 CIA, supra note 11.
14 STOICOIU, supra note 12, at 2.
' Tiberiu Dianu, The Romanian Criminal Justice System, in LEGAL REFORM IN POST-
COMMUNIST EUROPE: THE VIEW FROM WITHIN 257 (Stanislaw Frankowski & Paul B. Stephan
III eds., 1995).
16 Id. at 258.
17 Id.
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communist revolutions that swept Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s
overthrew President Ceausescu's government. 8 Elections occurred in May
1990, and the new parliament's "main task.., was to draw up the details of
[a new] constitution."' 9  Parliament ratified said constitution in 1991,
"providing for a liberal democracy, although with strong powers retained by
",20the President....
As Romanian law relates to drug regulation and control, Romania has
always attempted to at least acquiesce to international attempts to regulate the
trade. For example, Romania adopted the Geneva Convention of 1936 for the
Suppression of the Illicit Drug Traffic in Dangerous Drugs.2' The 1936
Convention came out of the work of the League of Nations, of which Romania
was a very active member.22
"The first international provisions intended for the prosecution and
extradition of [illicit drug] traffickers ... appeared in the 1936 Convention." 3
Prior to this, only licit drugs were regulated internationally.
In 1961, Romania became a signatory to the United Nations Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs.24 This treaty marked a watershed in combating
international drug trafficking and abuse, as it coordinated international action
on the matter. Article 35 of the treaty dealt with illicit traffic, providing that
signatories "[m]ake arrangements at the national level for co-ordination of
preventive and repressive action against the illicit traffic [of drugs]."25
Article 36 outlined the penal provisions of the treaty where signatories agreed
to:
adopt such measures as will ensure that ... distribution,
delivery on any terms whatsoever, . . . dispatch, dispatch in
transit, transport, importation and exportation of drugs contrary
to the provisions of this Convention . . . shall be punishable
18 MARTYN RADY, ROMANIA IN TuRMOIL: A CONTEMPORARY HISTORY 99 (1992).
19 Id. at 161.
20 Id. at 195 n.2.
2! J.G. Starke, The Convention of 1936 for the Suppression of the Illicit Drug Traffic in
Dangerous Drugs, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 31 (1937).
22 I. Bayer & H. Ghodse, Evolution of International Drug Control 1945-1995, in U.N.
OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME [UNODC], BULLETIN ON NARCOTICS 1 (1999), available at http://
www.unodc.org/pdf/bulletin_1999-01-01_ .pdf.
23 Id. at 5.
24 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407,520 U.N.T.S. 204,
available athttp://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1 961 en.pdf[hereinafter 1961 Convention].
25 Id. art. 35.
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offences when committed intentionally, and that serious offences
shall be liable to adequate punishment particularly by
imprisonment or other penalties of deprivation of liberty.26
The treaty respected the laws of each signatory nation; any punishment would
be carried out "[s]ubject to the constitutional limitations of a Party, its legal
system and domestic law."27 This treaty expressly states, as do all subsequent
treaties on the subject, that "[n]othing contained in this article shall affect the
principle that the offences to which it refers shall be defined, prosecuted and
punished in conformity with the domestic law of a Party."2 This deference to
the native law of the signatory gave the member nation wide latitude to adopt
and enforce laws as it saw fit.
Pursuant to the acceptance of this treaty, Romania enacted a new criminal
code in 1969, which added drug trafficking to the list of punishable offenses.29
In 1971, U.N. members, including Romania, entered into the Convention on
Psychotropic Substances, which extended the 1961 treaty to cover chemical
substances that act primarily upon the central nervous system, resulting in
temporary alteration of perception and behavior. When the U.N. adopted the
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances in 1988, Romania did not send a delegation.3' The 1988
Convention recognized "the need to reinforce and supplement the measures
provided in [the prior Conventions] in order to counter the magnitude and
extent of illicit traffic . ..."32 Article 18 of the 1988 Convention was
particularly of note, as it mandated the establishment and maintenance of
surveillance systems at border control points.33 It also extended the scope of
26 Id. art. 36(1)(a).
27 Id. art. 36(2).
2 Id. art. 36(4).
29 Dianu, supra note 15, at 258.
30 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21, 1971, 32 U.S.T. 543, 1019
U.N.T.S. 175, availableathttp://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1971 _en.pdf [hereinafter 1971
Convention].
31 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 49, available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention
1988_en.pdf [hereinafter 1988 Convention]. The social unrest in Romania in 1988 due to
President Ceausescu's implementation ofhis "systematization" plan may have been a factor; this
unrest ultimately led to Ceausescu's eventual overthrow and execution. See RADY, supra
note 18, at68, 119.
32 1988 Convention, supra note 31, pmbl.
Id. art. 18(2)(a) & (c). The specific language:
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the prohibited materials to include "materials and equipment for illicit
production or manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances....
Romania subsequently ratified the 1988 Convention on January 21, 1993
and rapid change followed.35 The U.S. State Department's 1993 International
Narcotics Strategy Report stated that "[a]lthough drug control is not a high
priority... Romania [had] begun to draft a country-wide antidrug strategy. 3 6
By 1994, "the Romanian police, customs, and security services all [had]
established counternarcotics departments and investigative programs and
operations., 37 By 1998, the nation, with the help of the EU PHARE program,3"
had completed an enhancement of their border crossing facilities, including
"much-needed inspection equipment., 39 The Ministry of the Interior organized
a Squad for Combating Organized Crime and Corruption (BCCOC); this
organization was "split into two distinct units" in 1999- one for domestic
narcotics control, the other "concentrate[d] on international drug trafficking.,
41
These new policies and administrative changes have paid off; the convictions
for drug-related offenses have increased from 107 in 1997 to 524 in 2004.4"
The Parties shall endeavour... [t]o monitor the movement of goods and
persons in free trade zones... and, to that end, shall empower the competent
authorities to search cargoes and incoming and outgoing vessels... and,
when appropriate, to search crew members, passengers and their baggage;...
[t]o establish and maintain surveillance systems in harbour and dock areas
and at airports and border control points in free trade zones and free ports.
14 Id. art. 13.
3' UNODC, Status of Treaty Adherence As at 13 July 2007, 7, http://www.unodc.org/pdfg
treatyadherenceconvention 1988.pdf.
36 BUREAU FOR INT'L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 365 (1994), available at http://dosf
an.lib.uic.edu/ERC/law/INC/1 994/08.html.
37 BUREAU FOR INT'L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
INTERNATIONALNARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 369 (1995), available at http://dosfa
n.lib.uic.edu/ERC/law/INC/1995/08.html.
31 See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
39 BUREAU FOR INT'L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
INTERNATIONALNARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (1999), available at http://www.state.
gov/www/global/narcoticslaw/1998_narc-report/europ98_part5.html.
40 BUREAU FOR INT'L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
INTERNATIONALNARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (2000), available at http://www.state.
gov/www/global/narcotics_law/i 999_narc-report/europ99_part5.html.
41 Compare U.S. DEP'TOFSTATE, supra note 39, with BUREAU FOR INT'LNARCOTICS & LAW
ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONALNARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY
REPORT (2005), available at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2005/voll/html/42368.htm.
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B. The European Union
The European Union traces its roots back to the after-effects of the 1951
Treaty of Paris, which created the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) for the regulation of economic matters relating to the trade of coal and
steel.42 The treaty was limited to Belgium, Germany, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.43 The same nations came together in 1957
to create the European Economic Community, with the intent of"eliminat[ing]
the barriers which divide Europe . . . by thus pooling their resources to
preserve and strengthen peace and liberty. .. ." Great Britain staunchly
rejected any idea of admission until 1961, when it attempted to officially apply
for admission, then revoked its submission.45 The U.K. attempted to accede
again in 1967, and finally negotiated their admission to the Community
in 1973.46 Member States later amended and combined the founding treaties,
setting a goal of forming an "internal market... compris[ing] an area without
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and
capital is ensured" by the end of 1992." 7
In 1985, the Schengen Agreement was implemented between Belgium,
France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.4" This agreement
provided that "police and customs authorities shall... carry out simple visual
surveillance of private vehicles crossing the common border [between
signatory states] at reduced speed, without requiring such vehicles to stop."49
However, these statistics may be misleading-use of drugs such as amphetamines and ecstasy
have grown dramatically since 2000; and yet, "Romanian youths have one of the lowest drug
prevalence rates on the continent .. " Razvan Amariei, Drug Use In Romania Poses New
Challenges, SOUTHEAST EuR. TIMES, Apr. 24,2006, available at http://www.setimes.com/coco
on/setimes/xhtml/en GB/features/setimes/features/2006/04/24/feature-03.
42 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 19, 1951, 261"
U.N.T.S. 140.
43 Id.
4 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community 3, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11.
41 JEAN-PIERRE PUISSOCHET, THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: A
COMMENTARY ON THE TREATY AND THE ACTS CONCERNING THE ACCESSION OF DENMARK,
IRELAND, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 2 (1975).
4 Id. at 7, 427.
41 Single European Act art. 8a, Feb. 17, 1986, 1986 O.J. (L 169) 1, 25 I.L.M. 510.
48 Agreement Between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the
Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at
Their Common Borders, June 14, 1985, 2000 O.J. (L 239) 13 [hereinafter Schengen acquis].
49 Id. art. 2.
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Furthermore, nationals of the Member States were allowed to "affix to the
windscreen a green disc measuring at least eight centimeters in diameter...
indicat[ing] that they have complied with border police rules, are carrying only
goods permitted under the duty-free arrangements and have complied with
exchange regulations."5 ° The signatories also agreed to coordinate their
actions on combating illicit drug trafficking, by "reinforc[ing] cooperation
between their customs and police authorities" in the short term." In the longer
term, the Member States promised "to seek to harmonise laws and
regulations... on narcotic drugs .. ."52
The Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement outlined specific
goals and plans for drug controls.5 3 This Convention adopted by reference the
existing United Nations Conventions at that time, and "all necessary measures
to prevent and punish the illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances." 4
Interestingly, Article 73 of the Convention specifically states that Member
States agreed to "allow controlled deliveries to be made" of illicit drugs, only
requiring that the Member States "retain responsibility for and control over any
operation carried out in its own territory."" Presumably, this was directed at
the Netherlands, which historically has had a policy of tolerance toward what
it terms "soft drug use" (primarily the use of hashish and marijuana).56
The European Community's goal of a European free market "without
internal frontiers" finally came to pass with the Maastricht Treaty of
February 1992." 7 Under the Treaty's Article 8a, all persons "holding the
nationality of a Member State [are thereby] citizen[s] of the Union.518
'° Id. art. 1.
"' Id. art. 9.
2 Id. art. 19.
11 Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 Between the
Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany
and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders,
June 14, 1985, 2000 O.J. (L 239) 19, 38.
14 Id. art. 70.
11 Id. art. 73.
56 NL Planet, Dutch Soft Drugs Policy, http://www.nlplanet.con/nlguides/topic.php?id=l I
(last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
17 RICHARD CORBETT, THE TREATY OF MAASTRICHT: FROM CONCEPTION TO RATIFICATION:
A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE GuIDE 2 (1993). The Maastricht treaty is really a "series of
amendments to the existing [EC] treaties and not a treaty in its own right." See Eurotreaties,
Maastricht Treaty, http://www.eurotraties.com/maastrichtext.html
58 CORBETT, supra note 57, at 389.
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Accordingly, as citizens of the Union, all persons within the EU have "the right
to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States,"
effectively rescinding the border controls of the pre-accession period.59 This
particular portion of the Treaty was considered problematic, even during early
discussions of ratification. The Dutch Government presented a "Policy
Document on European Political Union" to its Parliament in late 1990, which
recognized the potential harm of ratifying Article 8a, stating "the debate on
free movement of persons, etc. raises fundamental aspects of law and order..
. [R]oom would have to be left for national policies on criminal justice in
matters not directly related to the free movement of persons."60 The report
went on to stress that the member nations were "not yet prepared to go as far
as what was agreed at Schengen."' In subsequent drafts of the Treaty moving
toward ratification, however, the Dutch government did not make any
substantial changes to the text of the section. The final ratified Maastricht
Treaty made no direct mention of the Schengen acquis, although it seemed
clear that it modeled the "free movement" language from Article 8a.
In 1990, Italy, Spain, and Portugal joined the Schengen acquis, followed by
Greece in 1992, Austria in 1995, and Denmark, Finland, and Sweden in 1996.62
59 Id.
60 Id. at 176.
61 Id.
62 Agreement on the Accession of the Italian Republic to the Convention Implementing the
Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 Between the Governments of the States of the Benelux
Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual
Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders Signed at Schengen on 19 June 1990, 2000 O.J.
(L 239) 63; Agreement on the Accession of the Kingdom of Spain to the Convention
Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 Between the Governments of the States
of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on
the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders Signed at Schengen on 19 June
1990, to which the Italian Republic Acceded by the Agreement Signed at Paris on 27 November
1990, 2000 O.J. (L 239) 69; Agreement on the Accession of the Portuguese Republic to the
Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 Between the Governments
of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French
Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders Signed at Schengen on
19 June 1990, to Which the Italian Republic Acceded by the Agreement Signed at Paris on 27
November 1990, 2000 O.J. (L 239) 76; Agreement on the Accession of the Hellenic Republic
to the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 Between the
Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany
and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders Signed
at Schengen on 19 June 1990, to Which the Italian Republic Acceded by the Agreement Signed
at Paris on 27 November 1990, and to Which the Kingdom of Spain and the Hellenic Republic
acceded by the Agreements Signed at Bonn on 25 June 1991, 2000 O.J. (L 239) 83; Agreement
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The implementation deadline for the Schengen Agreement to be applied to all
signatories was initially set for January 1, 1993, but due to Member States'
differing views on the interpretation of the terms, they did not meet that
deadline.63 The Agreement finally came into effect in March 1995 for all
signatories.6'
In 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty amended the Treaty of the EU, creating "the
major European political and legal framework within which ... European
citizens will have to live. .. ."65 One of the main changes noted in the
Amsterdam Treaty included the establishment of "an 'area of freedom,
security, and justice.' "66 "This 'area' is defined as one 'in which the free
movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with
respect to external border controls ... and the prevention and combating of
crime.' "67 This effectively integrated the Schengen acquis into the greater
EU. All previous signatories to the Schengen acquis were still bound by it, but
significantly, Member States Ireland and the United Kingdom were
"guarantee[d] ... a complete 'opt-out'. . . from" being so bound.6"
on the Accession of the Republic of Austria to the Convention Implementing the Schengen
Agreement of 14 June 1985 Between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic
Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of
Checks at Their Common Borders Signed at Schengen on 19 June 1990, to Which the Italian
Republic, the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic, and the Hellenic Republic
acceded by the Agreements Signed on 27 November 1990, on 25 June 1991 and on 6 November
1992, Respectively, 2000 O.J. (L 239) 90; Agreement on the Accession of the Kingdom of
Denmark to the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 on the
Gradual Abolition of Checks at the Common Borders Signed at Schengen on 19 June 1990,2000
O.J. (L 239) 97; Agreement on the Accession of the Republic of Finland to the Convention
Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at
the Common Borders Signed at Schengen on 19 June 1990,2000 O.J. (L 239) 106; Agreement
on the Accession of the Kingdom of Sweden to the Convention Implementing the Schengen
Agreement of 14 June 1985 on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at the Common Borders Signed
at Schengen on 19 June 1990, 2000 O.J. (L 239) 115.
63 Europa, Free Movement of Persons, Asylum, Immigration and Borders: An Introduction,
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l 14001 .htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
1 Europa, Abolition of Internal Borders and Creation of a Single EU External Frontier,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/freetravel/frontiers/fsjfreetravel-schengenen.htm (last
visited Oct. 16, 2007).
65 THE EUROPEAN UNION AFTER THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM 2 (J6rg Monar & Wolfgang
Wessels eds., 2001) [hereinafter EU AFTER AMSTERDAM].
6Id. at 267.
67 Id. at 269.
61 Id. at 285. See also Protocol on the Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland on
Policies in Respect of Border Controls, Asylum and Immigration Judicial Cooperation in Civil
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Another result coming out of the Amsterdam Council was the decision to
"inaugurate the enlargement process."6 9 Other European nations had seen the
economic benefits of membership in the EU, particularly Eastern European
states that struggled to create capitalist economies after the fall of
Communism. Nations including Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania began to line
up to apply for membership to the EU.70
European Union accession requires a lengthy process. The European
Commission website outlines that:
A country that wishes to join the EU submits an application
for membership to the Council of the European Union, which
asks the European Commission to assess the applicant's ability
to meet the conditions of membership, and particularly
compliance with the basic values of the EU: . . . "liberty,
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
and the rule of law...."
... [Negotiations are opened and] cover the entire EU acquis,
chapter-by-chapter, to seek agreement on when and how the
candidate will align its laws and practice with EU requirements.71
Notably, one key requirement for acceding nations is "that the Schengen
acquis must be accepted in full by all candidate countries before admission."72
As Member States join the EU, "the Schengen Convention abolish[es] the
checks at internal borders . . . creat[ing] a single external frontier, where
Matters and on Police Cooperation art. 3, Oct. 29, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 353, http://europa.
eu/eur-lex/en/treaties/selected/livre316.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2007) [hereinafter Protocol
UK].
The United Kingdom or Ireland may notify ... in writing... that it wishes
to take part in the adoption and application of any such proposed measure....
If after a reasonable period of time a measure... cannot be adopted with
the United Kingdom or Ireland taking part, the Council may adopt such
measure... without the participation of the United Kingdom or Ireland.
69 EU AFTER AMSTERDAM, supra note 65, at 56.
70 Romania applied for membership in 1995. Press Release, Europa, Two New Members
Join the EU Family (Dec. 28, 2006), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=IP/06/1900&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
71 European Commission, Enlargement: Questions and Answers, http://ec.europa.eu/enlar
gement/questions and-answers/backgrounden.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
72 EU AFTER AMSTERDAM, supra note 65, at 63.
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checks for all the Schengen signatories [are] to be carried out.... "73 Thus, the
outer border of the Schengen area expands as new nations come into the fold.
There were some "Amsterdam leftovers" that needed to be addressed
following the Treaty; specifically, enlargement of the Union was allowed only
with the "condition of a reduction of the size of the Commission... and some
modification of the weighting of votes."74 Consequently, the drafting of the
Treaty of Nice corrected these perceived deficiencies in the rights of Member
States.75 With all necessary institutional changes finally in place, the accession
of applicant states from Central and Eastern Europe could begin in earnest.
The EU had been preparing to bring in Central and Eastern European
nations since 1989, after the fall of communism behind the Iron Curtain. One
of the early programs set up by the EU was the PHARE 76 program, designed
to "assist Poland and Hungary... [in] the momentous changes taking place in
their countries" by providing sources of finance for the development of a
democratic and capitalist society. 7 It later expanded to eleven nations,78 and
in 1993, the EU tied eligibility for accession to participation in the PHARE
program.79 Of the thirteen nations supported by PHARE in 1993, all but
Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania became Member States of the EU on
May 1, 2004.80
As the EU set up its pseudo-governmental structure, the stark realities of
drug use and trafficking within Member States necessitated an action plan be
created to combat drugs. The EU first drafted such a plan in 1995, and
proposed the implementation of Title VI of the Treaty of European Union,
which "requires Member States of the Union to cooperate on questions of
" Europa, supra note 64.
14 Finn Laursen, Overview ofthe Intergovernmental Conference 2000 and the Treaty ofNice,
in THE TREATY OF NICE: ACTOR PREFERENCES, BARGAINING, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE 2 (Finn
Laursen ed., 2006).
I d. at 11. The Treaty was ratified in 2001, and went into effect on Feb. 1, 2003. Id.
76 Pologne, Hongrie Assistance A la Reconstruction Economique (Assistance to Poland and
Hungary for Economic Reconstruction).
77 EUROPEAN COMM'N PHARE INFO. OFF., What is Phare?: A European Union Initiative for
Economic Integration With Central and Eastern European Countries 4 (1994).
7 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia,
and Romania including Hungary and Poland. Id.
79 European Commission, Phare, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/financialassistance/phare/
index en.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2007).
1 Infoeuropa, Enlargement Process, http://www.infoeuropa.ro/jsp/page.jsp?cid=7&lid=2
(last visited Oct. 17, 2006). Cyprus and Malta also joined on the same date. Id
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common interest in judicial, customs and police affairs.' The European Law
Enforcement Organization (EUROPOL), now the main arm of the EU in
fighting organized crime, was initially set up as the Europol Drugs Unit (EDU)
to combat drug trafficking.82 The EU suggested reports every five years to
report both current progress and proposed plans for future initiatives in the
fight against drugs. By 1999, a European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and
Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) had been set up, and was working closely with
Europol."3 The plan for 2000-2004 identified "preparations for enlargement
with participation by applicant countries in EMCDDA and EU drug addiction
projects and measures under the Phare Programme" as a priority.84 In 2002,
the Eurojust organization was established, becoming a body of the EU "with
legal personality., 85 The purpose of Eurojust was to improve cooperation
between the authorities of the Member States, particularly in relation to
investigation, prosecution, and extradition.86
By December 2004, the European Council had identified its general aims
in their 2005-2012 EU Drugs Strategy, one of which is "striv[ing] to ensure
a high level of security for the general public by fighting ... cross-border
trafficking in drugs .... "87 The Council, in an understatement, admitted that
"[t]he disappearance of most border checks at internal borders has made the
EU an ever more attractive market for illegal drugs.... ,88 The specific Action
Plans for 2005-2008 in the area of drug supply reduction primarily relate to
information gathering and sharing between countries, with little specifics on
81 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a
European Action Plan to Combat Drugs (1996-2000), 10, COM (1994) 234 final (June 23,
1994), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/2955/01/048.pdf
82 EUROPOL, Fact Sheet on Europol 2007, http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=
facts.
83 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee on the Regions on a European Union
Action Plan to Combat Drugs (2000-2004), COM (1999) 239 final (May 26, 1999), available
at http://aei.pitt.edu/4950/01/003140_1.pdf.
84 Europa, Action Plan to Combat Drugs (2000-2004), http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lv
b/133092.htm.
85 Council Decision of 28 February 2002 Setting up Eurojust With a View to Reinforcing
the Fight Against Serious Crime, art. 1, 2002 O.J. (L 63) 1, 2.
86 Id. art. 3, at 2-3.
87 Europa, The EU Drugs Strategy (2005-2012), http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/cha/c22
569.htm [hereinafter Drugs Strategy 2005-2012] (summarizing Note from the Council of 22
November 2004 on the EU Drugs Strategy for the period 2005-2012, No. 15074/04).
88 Id.
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border controls.8 9 The Council has similarly nebulous plans for dealing with
acceding countries, such as "provid[ing] the necessary technical and other
assistance to these countries to familiarise them with the EU [acquis] and to
assist them in carrying out the required actions."9° Specifically, the EU
encouraged the "exchange [of] information on drug related technical assistance
projects and operational activities.., in particular to identify duplication and
91gaps....
Early in the process of creating the Drugs Policy for the EU, the European
Council adopted a troubling Joint Action relating to the practices and laws of
Member States. 92 Specifically, the Joint Action required Member States to
"endeavour to approximate their laws to make them mutually compatible to the
extent necessary to prevent and combat illegal drug trafficking in the Union"
and to "ensure that under their legal systems the penalties imposed for serious
drug trafficking are among the most severe penalties available for crimes of
comparable gravity." 93 However, unlike the U.N. Conventions on narcotic and
psychotropic drugs that the Joint Action cites and appears to be based upon, 94
it pointedly does not leave the choice of compliance with the Member State,
and instead merely states that "[n]othing in this joint action shall prevent a
Member State... from maintaining or introducing.., any additional measure
it deems appropriate.., to prevent and combat illicit drug trafficking." 95 This
seems to imply that the minimums must be met, without question, with only a
right to go further being reserved to the Member State.
The Commission of the European Communities subsequently adopted this
Joint Action created in 1996, with a few revisions in 1997, as a framework for
minimum provisions for elements of and penalties against drug trafficking.96
" EU Drugs Action Plan (2005-2008), 2005 O.J. (C 168) 1, 7-12, available at http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/c 168/c_16820050708en0001 001 8.pdf[hereinafter Action
Plan 2005-2008].
90 Id. at Objective 32, Action.
9' Id. at Objective 38, Action 1.
92 Joint Action of 17 December 1996 Adopted by the Council on the Basis of Article K.3 of
the Treaty on European Union Concerning the Approximation of the Laws and Practices of the
Member States of the European Union to Combat Drug Addiction and to Prevent and Combat
Illegal Drug Trafficking, 1996 O.J. (L 342) 6 [hereinafter Joint Action].
93 Id. arts. 1, 4.
14 Id. art. 7; 1961 Convention, supra note 24; 1971 Convention, supra note 30; 1988
Convention, supra note 31.
9' Joint Action, supra note 92, art. 10.
96 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision Laying Down Minimum Provisions on the
Constituent Elements of Criminal Acts and Penalties in the Field of Illicit Drug Trafficking,
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The Commission concluded that "[t]he aims of this framework decision cannot
be achieved by the Member States, given the transnational dimension of the
offence, and can therefore best be attained by the European Union... ."" The
framework decisions are binding upon all Member States, "but leave the
choice of form and means to their discretion... [which leaves Member States]
some degree of flexibility to adapt their legislation to these rules and to
determine the severity of the penalties that apply, within the limits imposed by
the framework decision."98 However, the Commission quickly follows that
assertion with the requirement that in the "most serious cases.., the maximum
sentence may not be less than five years."99
Most surprising, however, is the fact that the EU even recognizes a supreme
law that supersedes individual Member States' national laws. The
development of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) parallels that of the EU;
the ECJ originally served as a check upon the supranational institutions of the
ECSC. 00 Since then, it has evolved into a court of law where individual EU
citizens may seek redress, provided a corresponding national law exists that
creates a right for that individual.'01 The logical consequence of having
individual rights at a supranational level is the supremacy of European Law
over national law, "otherwise states could avoid their obligations simply by
passing new national rules."'
10 2
This approach, although never contested for over four decades, draws
criticism from national judges. 3 During the ratification of the Treaty of
Maastricht, several nations "argued strongly against any interpretation that
would allow national courts to evaluate the compatibility of European law with
national law," despite this having been the custom for decades.'" The concern
for the judicial systems of individual nations is that European supremacy of
law will result in weakened national sovereignty.'0 5 Much like Britain fought
COM (2001) 259 final (May 23,2001), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/
corn/200l/corn200l_0259en01 .pdf.
97 Id. at 3.
98 Id. at 7.
99 Id.
100 KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE MAKING OF AN
INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE 5 (2001).
101 Id. at 17. This doctrine is known as the "Doctrine of Direct Effect," and was declared in
1963. Id.
102 Id. at 18.
103 Id. at 60.
'04 Id. at 182.
105 Id.
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the development of the EU, it has been a leader in fighting against international
law superseding its national statutory law. In 1995, Britain attempted to
implement a number of proposals to make the ECJ "more politically
accountable and to limit the cost of ECJ decisions."' 6 The proposals went so
far as to suggest both a "political appeals process whereby member states
could overturn ECJ decisions... [and a change of] jurisdictional authority."'0 7
The proposals failed, and the ECJ retained its power.' 8
ECJ oversight initially excluded certain areas of European law, including
the Schengen acquis of 1990.'09 The Maastricht Treaty provides that "future
conventions 'may stipulate that the Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to
interpret [subsequent Convention] provisions and to rule on any disputes
regarding their application.' ""o Pursuant to this power in 1997, the Treaty of
Amsterdam moved the Schengen Agreement into the jurisdiction of the ECJ. "'
Matters may be referred from the national courts to the ECJ by national judges,
if there is sufficient question of law requiring ECJ interpretation.' " 2 However,
in certain areas of border controls, including drug trafficking, individual
Member States have the power to deny national courts the right of reference,
thereby "keep[ing] the ECJ out of domestic issues.""' ' These regulations, of
course, pertain solely to Member States, not to nations awaiting accession.
The EU has also recognized that the Schengen process has not only
"facilitated the free movement of European citizens, but has also [made] it
easier for criminals to operate transnationally. . . ."' ' The police power and
judicial reach of Member Nations historically have been limited to operation
only within the jurisdiction bound by the nation's border.' Accordingly, the
European Council has attempted to ensure "approximation of legislation"
between EU nations to prevent criminals from using the variations of criminal
106 Id. at 197.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 197-98.
109 C.A. Groenendijk, The Competence of the EC Court of Justice with Respect to Inter-
governmental Treaties on Immigration andAsylum, 4 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 531,531-32(1992).
110 Id. (quoting Art. K.3(2)c of the Maastricht Treaty).
... ALTER, supra note 100, at 205.
112 Id. at60.
113 Id. at 205.
Europa, Prosecuting Criminals and Guaranteeing Individuals' Rights More Effectively in
Free Movement Europe, http://ec.europa.eu/justice-home/fsj/crimunal/fsj-criminal-introen.htm
(last visited Oct. 26, 2007).
115 Id.
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laws in different countries to their benefit." 6  In an effort to promote
uniformity of legislation between Member States on certain matters such as
international trafficking, suggested solutions under the approximation of
legislation approach include ratification of negotiation of legal texts "in order
to adopt common definitions and to harmonise the level of sanctions.""' 7 In
common parlance, EU nations should universalize their punishments for
criminal acts, particularly those relating to international crime.
The EU proposed and inaugurated an organization to assist in the control
of their external borders in 2004.' Under this European Agency for the
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (External
Borders Agency), Member States receive technical and training aid." 9 The EU
budgeted C960 million for 2004-2006 to assist the first wave of new members
in strengthening their borders during the first years of accession to the
Union.
21
With this backdrop of legislative and policy considerations, the question
still remains-exactly what is involved in full accession to the EU?
IH. ROMANIA AND THE EU
Even before acceding, Romania faced a number of requirements. In
preparation, Romania signed an Accession Partnership with the EU in 1999.121
The Partnership contained "priority areas for further work identified in the
Commission [for Accession]'s 1999 Regular Report... [and] the basis for a
number of policy instruments which will be used to help [Romania] in [its]
preparations for membership."'' 22 To meet the requirements of the Department
of Justice and Home Affairs, Romania had until 2000 to
116 Id.
117 Id.
' Council Regulation of 26 October 2004 Establishing a European Agency for the
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of
European Union 2004 O.J. (L 349) 1 (EC).
"9 Border Control-One Single EUBorder, EuRAcTrv, Apr. 20, 2005, http://www.euractiv.
com/en/justice/border-control-single-eu-border/article- 138329.
120 Id.
2I Council Decision of 6 December 1999 on the Principles, Priorities, Intermediate
Objectives and Conditions Contained in the Accession Partnership with Romania, 1999 O.J.
(L 335) 15.
122 Id. at 16.
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implement law on the Romanian state frontiers including the
merger of the Border Guard and Border Police; ... strengthen
border controls.., to enable full participation in the Schengen
Information System, upgrade law enforcement bodies and the
judiciary to continue the fight against.., drug trafficking, [and]
ensure better coordination between law enforcement bodies.
23
The Partnership also set up some medium-term goals, although setting no
specific deadline.1 24 Specifically, the Partnership required Romania to "adopt
and apply the international instruments related to the fight against drug
trafficking... implementing Article 17 of the United Nations Convention
against illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.' 25
This was a integral mandate for Romania; failure to comply with the
requirements would result in the revocation of PHARE funding, along with
other sources of monetary support for Romania. 26  Progress would be
monitored by the European Council through the Association Committee.'27
Following its first evaluation and regular report in 2001, the Commission
updated the Accession Partnership. 2 ' It recognized progress made regarding
the first set of requirements, and set new priorities. Within the Justice and
Home Affairs area, Romania had new requirements:
improve border management by (i) developing an integrated
border management strategy, (ii) implementing legislation for the
law on the state frontier and the law on the organisation and
functioning of the border police, . . .develop and present a
Schengen action plan, . . . [and] develop and implement a
national drugs strategy and establish a national focal point for
contacts with the European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and
Drug Addiction. 29
1 Id. at 18.
124 Id. at 19.
125 Id. at 21.
126 Id.
127 Id.
121 Council Decision of28 January 2002 on the Principles, Priorities, Intermediate Objectives
and Conditions Contained in the Accession Partnership With Romania, 2002 O.J. (L 44) 82.
129 Id. at 90.
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Romania quickly complied, developing a national drugs strategy by
September 2002, and submitting it to the EMCDDA.' 30 Under this strategy,
Romania established a National Anti-Drug Agency (NAA) in December 2002
within the Ministry of the Interior.' This organization works closely with and
submits annual reports to the EMCDDA, to ensure its actions cohere with EU
policy as a whole.1 2 The goals only address treatment of addicts in prisons
and the social re-integration of convicted drug users, while excluding
sentencing guidelines for drug traffickers.'33
Upon reevaluation in 2003, the Commission's priorities for Romania had
not changed dramatically, and it applauded the early steps, including
implementation of the NAA, and encouraged Romania to set a national
mandate "stipulat[ing] its main tasks and responsibilities."'
3 4
The Commission published a final Regular Report before the Treaty of
Accession in 2004.135 The Commission found that Romania had accomplished
almost all of their requirements, with only a few exceptions, such as the
improvements within Justice and Home Affairs Department.'36 Surveillance
and physical control of the borders continued to be a problem, and the
Commission suggested more equipment be installed to monitor the borders
with Turkey and the Black Sea.'37 Lack of progress in drug interdiction was
particularly criticized, as "drug smuggling into and through Romania
remain[ed] a serious challenge... [and] [e]nforcement in all areas remain[ed]
weak and the border seizure figures [were] still in many cases extremely
low."' 38 Consequently, the Commission suggested to the Council an additional
safeguard for Romania: "allow[ing] the Commission to recommend to the
130 Gov'T OF ROM., NATIONAL STRATEGY ON DRUGS 2002-2004 (Draft) (2002), available at
http://www.infoeuropa.ro/docs/ext/National %2Strategy/ 2Oon%2Drugs%202002-2004.pdf.
131 Decision on Establishing the National Anti-Drug Agency, Gov't Dec. No. 1489, Rom.
O.G. 956 (2002) (Rom.), available at http://www.ana.gov.ro/eng/decision.htm.
132 NATIONAL STRATEGY ON DRUGS 2002-2004, supra note 130, at 38.
133 Id. at 27.
134 Council Decision of 19 May 2003 on the Principles, Priorities Intermediate Objectives and
Conditions Contained in the Accession Partnership with Romania, 2003 O.J. (L 145) 21, 36.
135 COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN CMTYS., 2004 Regular Report on Romania's Progress
TowardAccession, available at http://www.euractiv.ro/www/storage/analize/ I 28.pdf [hereinafter
2004 Regular Report].
136 Id. at 13.
137 Id. at 125-26.
138 Id. at 128.
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Council at any time.., to postpone the envisaged date of accession.., by one
year to January 2008."'13
Alarmingly, the conclusions of the report bury some important language:
"urgent attention should be paid to completing legal approximation,
implementing the revised legal framework and further strengthening
administrative capacity.' ', 41 Without any prior requests, Romania was now
asked to update its criminal code to EU standards, but with little direction on
what that entailed.
Finally, in June 2005, sufficient progress had taken place to allow Romania
to sign the Treaty of Accession to the European Union, and begin an almost
two-year long marathon to meet all of the remaining accession requirements
spelled out in the 2004 report.14' Romania was compelled to comply with
application of both categories of provisions to the Schengen acquis.42
Category I, consisting of "[p]rovisions which are not related to the cancellation
of internal border checking of the Member States," must be complied with
"[until] the moment of adhesion to the EU. '143  This Category was not
evaluated during the Schengen evaluation. Category II, on the other hand,
consisting of those "[p]rovisions directly related to the cancellation of internal
border checking of the Member States . . . must be implemented and
simultaneously applied with the cancellation of the internal border checking,"
and were the provisions evaluated and approved by the EU Council.'
44
To accomplish the Category H1 provisions, Romania took "recommendations
and best practices" from earlier accessions.145 Areas needing improvement
before full accession included, but were not limited to, internal and external
border checking, long and short-term visa procedures, asylum applications,
police cooperation, firearms and ammunition, and narcotics146
"' Strategy Paper of the European Commission on Progress in the Enlargement Process, at
4, COM (2004) 657 final (Dec. 6, 2004).
,4o 2004 Regular Report, supra note 135, at 129.
141 Accession Treaty, supra note 1.
142 Min. oflnt. and Admin. Reform,Schengen Evaluation Process (Rom.),availableathttp://
www.mai.gov.ro/engleza/Documente/Shengen/Spatiu%20Shengen/Procesul-de evaluareSc
hengen.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2007).
143 Id.
14 Id.
145 Id.
146 Min. of Int. and Admin. Reform, The Main Aspects Approached by the Schengen
Convention (Rom.), available at http://www.mai.gov.ro/engleza/Documente/Shengen/Spatiu%
20Shengen/Principale-aspecteabordate-de-conventiaSchengen.pdf (last visited Oct. 20,
2007).
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Romania had just under a year to continue updating their border control
equipment, including updating computers to make them compatible with the
new Schengen Information System (SIS), which allows international
communication of salient data regarding immigrants and illegals.'47 As of
October 2005, this had not yet occurred.'48 However, by January 2006, the
European Commission and Romania ratified "the Programme for Realizing and
Implementing ISBS ''149 and set deadlines for its implementation in the next few
years. 150 The greatest barrier, according to the Ministry of Administration and
Interior, is "the tight deadlines for fulfilling the commitments."'
' 5
'
In the area of drug trafficking, Romania focused on an integrated approach
during the first six months, implementing the EU's 2005-2012 National Anti-
Drug Strategy 52 as well as the related 2005-2008 Action Plan.'53 However,
as outlined in Section II, these implementations did not truly represent much,
as these two documents were nebulous and lacked details.
By March 2006, as the Commission made its final inspections before
accession, more progress had been made. '54 Legislators passed bills adopting
minimum standards for the prevention of drugs in schools, including mandated
related curriculum, and several anti-drug directorates increased their
staffing. 55
September 2006 brought the final Monitoring Report by the Commission
about Romania's progress."' The Commission found that staffing levels
increased to 95% of the goal set for the NAA, and seizures of drugs increased
'47 See Comm'n of the European Cmtys., Dep't of Justice and Home Affairs, Justice and
Home Affairs in the EU Enlargement Process - Romania, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
justicehome/fsj/enlargement/romania/printer/fsjenlarge romania en.htm (last visited Oct. 20,
2007). Accord Ministry of Int. and Admin. Reform, Progress on Justice and Home Affairs, at
2 (Rom.), http://www.mai.gov.ro/engleza/Documente/Integrare%20UE/ProgressMAI_2006.pdf
(last visited Oct. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Progress].
48 Communication from the Commission: Comprehensive Monitoring Report on the State
of Preparedness for EU Membership of Bulgaria and Romania, at 17, COM (2005) 534 final
(Oct. 25, 2005).
49 Integrated System for Border Security.
I50 Progress, supra note 147, at 1.
151 Id.
'52 The EU Drugs Strategy (2005-2012), supra note 87.
153 EU Drugs Action Plan (2005-2008), supra note 89.
154 Progress, supra note 147, at 1.
.55 Id. at 7.
156 Communication from the Commission: Monitoring Report on the State of Preparedness
for EU Membership of Bulgaria and Romania, at 1, COM (2006) 549 final (Sept. 26, 2006).
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dramatically.157 In the area of justice system reform, "[a] Fundamental [sic]
review of Civil Code, Criminal Code... and Criminal Procedure Code [was]
started."' 8
The Commission released a final document in December 2006, naming
additional measures that should continue to be developed during accession.15 9
These additional measures included additional safeguards for the EU stating:
The remaining issues in the accountability and efficiency of the
judicial system and law enforcement bodies warrant the
establishment of a mechanism for cooperation and verification of
the progress of Romania to address specific benchmarks in the
areas of judicial reform ....
If Romania should fail to address the benchmarks adequately,
the Commission may apply safeguard measures.., including the
suspension of Member States' obligation to recognise and
execute... Romanian judgments and judicial decisions, such as
European arrest warrants. 16
0
Evaluation of the impact of "new civil and penal procedures codes" is included
among those benchmarks. 161 In short, if the EU does not like the direction of
Romania's court decisions, it is not bound to recognize them internationally,
despite their domestic validity.
On January 1, 2007, Romania acceded to the EU, after over ten years of
waiting. 16 While Romanians celebrated the event in Sofia, one reveler echoed
the sentiments of many of the new EU citizens, expressing "concern[ ] there
would be too much uniformity."'
' 63
157 Id. at 46.
158 Id. at 33.
159 Commission Decision of 13/XII/2006 Establishing a Mechanism for Cooperation and
Verification of Progress in Romania to Address Specific Benchmarks in the Areas of Judicial
Reform and the Fight Against Corruption, COM (2006) 6569 final (Dec. 13, 2006).
160 Id. at 3.
161 Id. at 5.
162 Press Release, supra note 70.
163 Romania, Bulgaria Join EU, USA TODAY, Dec. 31, 2006, available at http://www.usato
day.com/news/world/2006-12-3 l-romania-bulgaria-eu_x.htn.
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This concern is well-founded. Romania must, under threat of losing
economic aid, demonstrate its progress in remaining reforms to the
Commission every six months."6
IV. ANALYSIS
The EU has a valid concern regarding their external borders. With the
implementation of the Schengen acquis, the free movement of persons within
the Union requires "increased controls at the EU's external borders so as to
combat effectively the trafficking of ... drugs. ,,..5 Romania is a "major
transshipment point for Southwest Asian heroin transiting the Balkan route and
small amounts of Latin American cocaine bound for Western Europe, and
therefore of particular concern."'6 6 Consequently, it is logical for the EU to
request a strengthening of Romania's border controls, in order to lower the
influx of drugs into the Union. However, is this an appropriate burden to put
upon a nation solely because it lies at the border of the EU?
Researchers with the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels have
criticized this undue burden upon Eastern European nations in particular.'67
It criticizes the paradoxical contradiction of opening up internal borders
between existing Member States, allowing "free movement," yet requiring
"strict application of the Schengen acquis concerning border controls and
visa[s] . ,,."s The fact that these requirements are non-negotiable for
applicant states, but are optional and negotiable for existing members, is
particularly galling. Although it is entirely reasonable for national
governments to limit the influx of drugs at the external borders of a sovereign
state, the EU is not a unitary organization. Allowing non-external border states
to apply Schengen border controls as they wish, even allowing existing
members to opt out of the agreement,'69 but forcing compliance by new
applicants is fundamentally unfair. Such an approach would be akin to the
164 Id.
165 Europa, Europe in 12 Lessons: Lesson 10. Freedom, Security and Justice, http://europa.
eu/abc/12lessons/lesson_1 0/indexen.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2007).
166 CIA, supra note 11, at 461.
167 Joanna Apap & Angelina Tchorbadjiyska, What About the Neighbours?: The Impact of
Schengen Along the EU's External Borders 6 (Ctr. for European Pol'y Stud., Working
Document No. 210, 2004), available at http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/neighbours-impact-
schengen-eu-extemal-borders/article- 131877.
168 Id. at 1.
169 Protocol UK, supra note 68.
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United States applying stringent screening for possible terrorists after 9/11, but
allowing Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport in Atlanta, Georgia to opt
out due to its importance as a major airline hub. If the regulations are to be
enforced, they should be enforced evenly throughout the EU.
In the area of border controls, the EU budgeted an additional 4E336 million
for border controls in 2005, but this money was only payable to the "new
Member States," not to Romania. 70 The PHARE program provided E405.3
million to Romania as part of the pre-accession package, but those funds were
merely for international aid; 7' the PHARE cross-border funding program for
all of Central and Eastern Europe for fiscal year 2006, on the other hand, only
consisted of 4E100 million. 7 2 The cost for Romania to upgrade its borders
from 2004 to 2007, however, totaled over 4E658 million, with subcontracted
work worth E350 million.' Perhaps because of this shortfall in funding,
Romania did not begin construction of its first border inspection post until
January 2006.1
74
This discrepancy in requirements from the EU and funding from its
economic programs should concern Romania and other nations that are
applying to join the EU, particularly those that will be situated upon a new
external border. The EU entices nations with favored trade status, new labor
markets, 75 and the promise of a peaceful Europe, but demands that applicant
nations overhaul and reorganize large sectors of their government and
economic base with insufficient funding.
The EU required Romania to reform its judicial system, border controls,
criminal and penal codes, and law enforcement policies, among a wide variety
of other areas, even before it was allowed to apply for entry into the EU. The
PHARE program provided some funding for these reforms, but the sheer
magnitude of the process oftentimes cause such social reforms to receive less
170 Border Controls Between EU-15 and New Members to be Kept Until End 2006,
EURACTrV, May 6,2004, http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/neighbours-impact-schengen-eu-
extemal-borders/article-131877.
171 Diplomacy, The Pre-accession Assistance Granted to Romania by the European Union,
http://ue.mae.ro/index.php?lang--en&id=354 (last visited Oct. 28, 2007).
172 EUROPEAN PARL., Final Adoption ofAmending Budget No 4 of the European Union for
the Financial Year 2006, 2006 O.J. (L 356) 19.
173 Julian Bulandra, EADS Contract Was Legal, Says Former Interior Minister, ROMANIAN
DAILY, Nov. 17, 2005, available at http://romaniandaily.ro/cat30760/indexhtml.
171 Julian Bulandra, Work Starts on First Border Inspection Post, ROMANIAN DAILY, Jan. 20,
2006, available at http://romaniandaily.ro/cat66416/art6634743587.
' But see generally Apap & Tchorbadjiyska, supra note 167 (outlining the barriers to
international labor markets for citizens of new Member States).
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attention. 176 Furthermore, since Romania would become an external border for
the EU, it was subjected to greater requirements regarding the elimination of
drug trafficking and border controls than would an acceding state without an
external border, such as Switzerland.'77
The United Kingdom foresaw this unacceptable burden upon applicant
states in the early years of the European Communities. Britain, when initially
invited to join the European Communities, turned them down and instead
"forged their own economic club" with six other nations, mirroring the EC's
model. 178  The only difference between the two organizations was the
"question of surrendering sovereignty to a common authority," which London
opposed. 179 Much like Romania, Britain faced economic hardships in the early
1970s, was "allure[d by the] economic progress and prosperity of [the EC],"
and subsequently applied for and gained membership despite the accession
requirements. 8 0 By the time of the Maastricht Treaty, however, Britain had
regained its influence, and bargained for unique concessions that allowed them
to opt out of adoption of the Euro as national currency, while still remaining
a part of the Union- something unimaginable only twenty years prior.18 ' As
stated above, Britain also received special treatment in the Treaty of
Amsterdam, allowing it to "opt-out" of being bound by Schengen.'82
Romania, on the other hand, comes from a weak bargaining position,
suffering from widespread poverty and a "handicap[ped] . . .business
environment.' ' 183 Unlike Britain in the 1970s, this is not merely a temporary
economic setback: the Romanian economy is growing, but backward; inflation
and current-account deficits plague the national economy.'84 There is little
176 See, e.g., ROMANIAN ACADEMIC Soc'Y, ANNUAL REPORT AND FORECAST: ROMANIA iN
2006, at 29 (2005), available at http://www.sar.org.ro/files/22_pwr/ 20forecast202006%20en.
pdf (citing the lack of a "larger economic development strategy" in the development and
implementation of programs).
' Switzerland applied for membership in 1992, but "the issue is on ice for the foreseeable
future." Europa, The EU's Relations with Switzerland, http://ec.europa.eu/externalrelations/
switzerland/intro/index.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2007).
178 Pierre-Henri Laurent, Widening Europe: The Dilemmas of Community Success, 531
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 124, 126 (1994).
179 Id.
180 Id. at 127.
"'1 Id. at 131. See also CORBETT, supra note 57, at 461. Britain has the option of adopting
the Euro at some point in the future, but has thus far chosen not to do so.
82 See Protocol UK, supra note 68.
113 CIA, supra note 11, at 460.
14 Bulgaria and Romania: The New Kids on the Block, ECONOMIST, Jan. 4, 2007, available
at http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfn?storyid=8492549.
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hope that Romania will be able to negotiate for any concessions within the
next quarter century. Romania needs the EU far more than the EU needs
Romania.
Making sweeping governmental, social, and economic changes in order to
gain the support of the EU has often led to nations repealing long-standing
policies that more clearly represent the spirit of a nation. Before acceding to
the Union in 2004, Hungary rewrote its criminal code regarding drug crimes,
enacting stricter criminal punishments that increased the penalties for drug use
and funding the change through the elimination of many treatment programs. 85
Prior to this point, Hungary's laws "treat[ed] those perpetrators who are
victimised by the crime differently from [traffickers]," effectively treating the
end-users more gently than those who dealt drugs.186 In 2003, drug offenses
became punishable even if a small quantity was held for personal
consumption. 187 Initial results showed that consumption had fallen, but quickly
returned to rapid growth. 88 By 2005, after accession, Hungary realized that
this approach did not produce the desired effect. Legislators attempted to
rewrite the Criminal Code to again allow personal drug use; however, the
Constitutional Committee refused the amendment." 9 Thus, Hungary is forced
to retain their present EU-sanctioned approach to drug trafficking and users,
despite specific evidence showing that it is largely ineffective.
Ultimately, these requirements upon applicant states such as Romania can
be viewed as the logical conclusion of a fundamental problem of the EU; It has
attempted to become a federalist union, despite not having a single unified
document to spell out the separation of powers between the EU and the
Member States. In order to analyze the EU's approach, one must know the
proper terminology. Federalism is "a composite of several state organizations
and legal orders, those of the component states and the one of the central
state."' 9 In the United States model, the federal government has enumerated
185 EMCDDA, NATIONAL REPORT HUNGARY 2001 § 1.2, available at http://candidates200
2.emcdda.europa.eu/2002-ceecs-report/section-2-about-ceecs/hungary/hu-nr-2001 .doc.
186 Id.
17 EMCDDA, ANNuAL REPORT 2003: THE STATE OF THE DRUGS PROBLEM IN THE ACCEDING
AND CANDIDATE COUNTRIES To THE EUROPEAN UNION: TRAFFICKING, available at http://www.
emcdda.europa.eu/?nNodelD=435.
18 See generally EUROPEAN MONITORING CTR. FOR DRUGS & DRUG ADDICTION, 2005
NATIONAL REPORT (2004 DATA) TO THE EMCDDA: HUNGARY (2005), available at http://www.
emcdda.europa.eu/?nNodelD=435 (follow first "Hungary EN" PDF link) (describing overall
drug statistics).
189 Id. § 1.1.
o Siegfried Wiessner, Federalism: An Architecture for Freedom, 1 NEW EuR. L. REV. 129,
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powers from the Constitution, with the residual powers of the states protected
by the Tenth Amendment.
However, the EU does not have a constitution; when the proposed EU
Constitution was sent among Member States for ratification, the French and
Dutch flatly rejected it, leading a remaining seven nations to shelve plans for
holding referendums. 9' Why do nations oppose the Constitution? Among
other things, they fear the "loss of sovereignty and national identity," and think
that the EU "is a project of the elite, not the ordinary people."' 92
This is clearly a problem that applicant countries are facing. The economic
powerhouses of Western Europe are setting the standards for applicants in
Eastern Europe and forcing them to chase membership in the Union by
accepting requirements that would historically only be post-war concessions.'93
Nations are being asked to rewrite their laws to reflect a recommended EU
model of domestic criminal justice, and engage in an expensive reform of
border security that benefits the Union more than it does the nation.
How is the EU better benefited than Romania by heightened border
controls? Would not Romania benefit itself from the increase in security on
the edge of the Schengen area? This argument fails to consider the present
status of Romanian drug use. Although a major thoroughfare for drug
traffickers, Romania is a low consumer of drugs.'94 As recently as 2006,
studies showed Romania as a nation with one of the lowest rates of drug abuse
in Europe.,9 Experts have stated that they fear the effect of EU accession
upon drug rates, not due to border concerns, but rather the increase in living
standards that comes with EU membership. 9 6 Paradoxically, becoming part
132 (1993).
... EUConstitution: Where Member States Stand, BBCNEwS, Mar. 5,2007, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/europe/3954327.stm.
192 Stephen Malvey, Varied Reasons Behind the Dutch 'No,' BBC NEWS, June 1, 2005,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4601731 .stm.
193 See, e.g., J6rg Monar, Justice and Home Affairs in an Enlarged European Union,
CHALLENGE EUROPE, June 14,2000, http://www.epc.eu/en/ce.asp?TYP=CE&LV = 177&see-y&t
=42&PG=CE/EN/detail&l=14&AI=25 (comparing present border control measures to those
under the Cold War's "Iron Curtain"). See generally ALFRED C. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN
OCCUPIED JAPAN: A PARTICIPANT LOOKS BACK (1976).
114 UNODC, 2006 WORLD DRUG REPORT 383-90 (2006), available at http://www.unodc.org/
pdfYWDR_2006/wdr2006_chap6_consumption.pdf. The Report tracked the percentage of the
population abusing opiates, cannabis, amphetamines, cocaine, and ecstasy. Romania's
percentage never exceeded 1% on any drug, whereas Western European nations exceeded 2%.
Id. at 384.
196 Amariei, supra note 41.
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of the EU will likely bring the scourge of drugs into Romania, rather than
assist it in stamping them out.
This level of burden upon Eastern Europe cannot continue without some
negative consequences. The economies of Romania and its fellow Eastern
European nations may fail due to the exceptional cost of meeting the
requirements of EU membership, requiring a new, more expensive PHARE
program, or its equivalent. On the other hand, there is no guarantee that the
EU would bail out their newest members, as most of the safeguard measures
appear to take a do-or-die approach to EU membership-either applicant
nations meet the requirements set forth, or all funding will be cut off. The
mind reels at the after effects of such action toward Romania and its neighbors.
What could be the result of the EU ceasing to support Romania, should they
fall behind in necessary requirements? Romania has made a point of keeping
very good relations with its non-EU neighbors, many of which are in similar
economic straits. 9 Romania has exhibited a history of canny diplomatic
relations; for example, they were "the first country to sign up for NATO's
Partnership for Peace program," and were among the first former Warsaw Pact
members seeking formal membership in NATO after the Iron Curtain fell. 9
Comparably, a strong Western Europe forced Germany into economic poverty
at the beginning of the last century, and the resulting economic depression was
a catalyst for World War II. Romania does not have supranational ambitions,
so this consequence is highly unlikely, but conflicts from Eastern Europe have
sparked multiple wars. Western Europe and the EU should be cautious when
potentially alienating Eastern European nations; after all, memories are long,
and past slights can be inflamed by careless actions today.
Furthermore, the next nations in line for accession include Turkey, Albania,
and several former Yugoslav republics;'9 all of which are either predominately
Muslim, or have (in the case of the former Yugoslavia) fought divisive wars
based on faith. They are also economically challenged, and would constitute
outer borders for the Union if allowed to accede. Should their accession be
blocked either by exorbitant requirements or worse, due to inability to perform
I" Min. of Foreign Aff., Foreign Policy, available at http://www.mae.ro/index.php?unde=
doc&id=5047 (last visited Oct. 28, 2007).
"g Encyclopedia of the Nations, Romania Foreign Policy, http://www.nationsencyclopedia.
com/World-Leaders-2003/Romania-FOREIGN-POLICY.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2007). The
NATO Partnership for Peace program served as a partnership between NATO and non-members,
creating an individual relationship with the organization.
"' European Commission, Enlargement, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/indexen.htm (last
visited Oct. 20, 2007).
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after making substantial capital investments, the backlash would most certainly
be catastrophic.
More positively, it would behoove the EU to recognize that under their
present non-constitutional framework, requiring applicant nations to meet
extremely stringent requirements in order to join the Union is unrealistic.
Gone are the days when acceding to the Union only meant giving up certain
trade restrictions and agreeing to share goods with all members. Today, new
applicant nations face invasive reorganizations ofjurisprudence, large capital
building projects, administrative changes, and the acceptance of a new body
of laws to govern their nation. Worse, existing Members cannot agree with
one another sufficiently to ratify a single constitution to codify once and for
all what level of government has supremacy: the sovereign Member Nations
or the EU.
If all Member States are not required to revise their criminal and civil codes
to meet "the EU ideal," then none should be required to do so. Conversely, if
the EU wishes to reform Romania's judicial system, then it should form a
committee to review and force reform on the judicial systems of all Member
States. This would undoubtedly result in the immediate dissolution of the EU
and economic ruin for Western Europe. Furthermore, if the security of the
external borders of the EU is important to Western Europe, then all Member
States should underwrite their upgrade. Nations that are entirely landlocked
should provide additional economic support, as their border controls should be
much less expensive following implementation of Schengen.
V. CONCLUSION
The future of the EU is murky at best. The grand dreams of the 1960s of
an "area of freedom, security, and justice"2 ' have become mired in the mud
of modern nationalism, economic downturns, and debates about terrorism,
border controls, and social ills. Even if the EU continues to grow, the
operation of such a federalist system without a controlling constitutional
document of some sort will result in chaos. Furthermore, as enlargement is
almost exclusively reaching Eastern Europe, greater care should be taken to
integrate the needs of the applicant nations into the EU, rather than vice versa.
If the EU wishes to create mandates for applicant nations, it should be prepared
200 EU AFTER AMSTERDAM, supra note 65, at 267.
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to pay for their implementation, or else watch the EU follow the Holy Roman
Empire"' into the dustbin of history.
In any case, Romania is working diligently at achieving benchmarks set out
by the EU. As shortly as six months after the January accession, however, the
EU has already begun to question Romania's progress in achieving the goals
set by the acquis, citing "a clear weakness in translating ... intentions into
results."2 2 Only time will tell if these early signals of EU displeasure at
Romania's ability to fulfill their obligations will result in a collapse in the
accession process. If so, this will not bode well for the future of the EU in its
attempts to construct a unified Europe.
20 The Holy Roman Empire was a political entity that covered a large part of Europe from
962 to 1806. It ultimately collapsed after member states, seeking autonomy, forced the Emperor
to abdicate and dissolve the Empire, or face war. See Heraldica, The Holy Roman Empire, http://
www.heraldica.org/topics/nationallUhre.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2007).
202 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Romania's
Progress on Accompanying Measures Following Accession, at 5, COM (2007) 378 final (June
27, 2007).

